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1  Introduction
As China’s economic and political power has grown 
in the past two decades, so too has its role in the 
international humanitarian sphere. The country’s 
increasing integration into mechanisms of multilateral 
humanitarian coordination has dovetailed with 
growing contributions to responses to major recent 
international emergencies, including the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Kashmir earthquake 
in 2005 and Cyclone Nargis in 2008. At the same 
time, however, there is a widely-held view that China 
does not always behave as a responsible global 
power should, and scholarship on its humanitarian 
activities is often critical of a perceived failure to 
adhere to established norms and practices. The 
existing literature tends to stress how China’s 
behaviour differs from that of Western countries in 
the humanitarian landscape, while comparatively 
little study has been dedicated to why China behaves 
‘differently’. 
Analysing this question requires moving away from 
a Western-centric model of humanitarian assistance. 
What is needed is an exploration of how the dynamic 
process of history has shaped China’s own ideas 
about caring for others. In line with the objective of 
the Humanitarian Policy Group’s ‘Global History of 
Modern Humanitarian Action’ project, this paper 
seeks to provide a better appreciation of China’s past 
to allow for a more comprehensive understanding of 
its unique humanitarian identity outside of the popular 
narrative, or as a supplement to today’s Western-
dominated discourses.
In an attempt to shed light on how the concepts which 
underlie ‘humanitarianism’ – such as compassion and 
the desire to alleviate suffering – has been understood 
during the course of China’s history, the paper examines 
its ancient roots by uncovering some of the origins of 
Chinese humanitarian thought. The chief focus of the 
paper, however, concerns the transformation of this 
concept over the twentieth century, and especially after 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. Without claiming to offer a fully representative 
account of humanitarian practice and thought in 
China, it provides an introduction to understandings 
of ‘humanitarianism’ and related concepts. In doing 
so, it seeks to explain the changes and continuities in 
the country’s approach to humanitarian action, while 
also investigating the different terminologies used to 
describe it, the sentiments driving it and how it has 
been delivered throughout the last century. The paper 
argues that China’s humanitarian thought and action 
have consistently, but to varying degrees, been shaped 
by the ancient conceptual paradigm of responsibility 
and legitimacy. These two concepts have shaped 
China’s political culture for millennia, and Chinese 
humanitarianism cannot be understood apart from 
them.
1.1 A note on translation and 
sources
One major challenge in the scholarship of China’s 
humanitarian sector lies in the ambiguity of the  
term ‘humanitarianism’ in the Chinese language.  
Although its literal translation, rendao zhuyi  
(人道主義), is used today in much the same way as 
the word ‘humanitarian’ in the English language, 
the notion is often conflated with renwen zhuyi 
(humanism) or even renben zhuyi (humanistic 
psychology) in philosophical contexts. Although 
prior to the twentieth century use of the word rendao 
was limited, the idea it represents has been deeply 
rooted in Chinese culture for millennia. Therefore, 
the paper explores the various corresponding terms 
used at various times which constitute or relate 
to the equivalent of the English understanding of 
humanitarianism.
Source materials for this paper include contemporary 
English-language accounts, Chinese and English 
newspapers and journals, analyses by Chinese and 
Western scholars, and United Nations documents. 
The work builds on a multidisciplinary literature 
on scholarship accompanying China’s evolving 
humanitarian thought and action, encompassing 
philosophy, religion, mythology, economics, the 
environment, politics and international law. 
The paper uses the system of transliteration from 
Chinese known as hanyu pinyin. Unless otherwise 
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stated the translations are the author’s own, with 
the exception of ancient Chinese texts, where those 
by James Legge are used. It should be noted that, 
in English texts, the Chinese term rendao zhuyi 
is interchangeably translated as humanism and 
humanitarianism; throughout this paper, rendao zhuyi 
will be referred to as ‘humanitarianism’ for the sake 
of consistency. The paper uses traditional Chinese 
characters until 1949, and simplified characters after 
the establishment of the PRC.
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2.1 Benevolence, morality 
and responsibility in Chinese 
philosophy
The word ‘humanitarian’, rendao (人道), makes its 
first explicit appearance in the Chinese classics of 
Confucius written more than two millennia ago. 
Translated as ‘the way of men’, ‘human duty’ or 
‘humanity’, it is often used in conjunction with the 
Confucian virtue of filial duty or ancestral worship. 
While explicit mention of this term in ancient texts 
is limited, the fundamental values underpinning the 
idea – concern for others or kindness – are reflected 
in a plethora of literature bequeathed by China’s rich 
Confucian heritage. The Book of Rites (Li Ji), an 
integral part of the Five Classics of the traditional 
Confucian canon, written before 300 BC, records: 
‘Benevolence (ren 仁)), righteousness  (yi 義), propriety 
(li 禮), and knowledge(zhi 智) – these make up the 
characteristic attributes of humanity (rendao)’.1 Of 
these four fundamental attributes, the most central 
to Confucian ethics is the concept of ren(仁 not to 
be confused with the homophonous ren 人 from 
rendao). Ren lies at the core of Confucian thought and 
appears more than any other word in the Analects of 
Confucius (Hua, 1995: 115). It can be translated as 
benevolence, humaneness, kindness, philanthropy and 
mutual love between two humans; indeed, its essence 
is evidenced in the character itself, which fuses the 
characters ‘human’(人) and ‘two’ (二).
Another integral component of the Confucian concept 
of ‘humanity’ (rendao) was a sense of morality, which 
is deeply connected with the notion of benevolence 
(ren). Confucian philosophy seeks a stable, well-
ordered state guaranteeing a harmonious society. This 
ideal unity among people was built on the ultimate 
goodness and moral conduct of all individuals, 
and predicated on a clearly defined social order 
where people had specific duties and obligations 
towards their social superiors. The ‘Five Bonds of 
Confucianism’ defined the principal relationships 
within China’s dynastic society, between ruler and 
ruled, father and son, elder and younger brother, 
husband and wife and friend and friend. In this highly 
hierarchical order, the wellbeing of the entire society 
depended on the dutiful fulfilment of each individual’s 
responsibility, and this sense of responsibility 
constituted the code of conduct and formed the 
cornerstone of interpersonal relationships in the lives 
of most Chinese.
Confucianism became the official ideology during 
the reign of Han Wu, emperor of the Western Han 
dynasty (156–87 BC). This fusion with the state was 
a much more intimate combination than the alliance 
between state and church in Europe, for unlike the 
church Confucianism did not have its own institution 
and instead became directly attached to the state (Lei 
and Tong, 2014: 30–31). However, while the influence 
of Confucianism in China cannot be understated, it 
did not enjoy a philosophical monopoly. Although 
Confucian teachings long predate the advent of 
Buddhism from India, Buddhist sentiments played a 
considerable role in Chinese philanthropic thought, 
and Confucian and Buddhist terms were used almost 
interchangeably. Examples are the strongly Confucian 
notion of yi (義) and the essentially Buddhist 
formulation of shan (善 charity, benevolence) (Will,  
1990: 138), or ‘acts of benevolence’(yixing 義行) and  
‘good deeds’ (shanju 善舉)  (Smith, 1998: 150). There 
were also characteristically Buddhist expressions of  
philanthropy such as the ‘hidden acts of charity’ (yinde  
陰德) which constitute acts of anonymous giving with 
the prospect of no immediate social recognition but 
a deferred ‘repayment’ (bao報), which might even be 
saved for a later life or for one’s descendants (Will, 
1990: 138). This concept of ‘repayment’ predated 
the advent of Buddhism (Smith, 1998: 150), but the 
2 Harmony and order: 
 humanitarianism in Imperial 
 China
1 ‘Four Principles Underlying the Dress of Mourning’: 3 (Sang Fu 
Si Zhi), Book of Rites (Li Jing).
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Buddhist karmic laws of cause and effect (yinguo 因果)  
and influence and response (ganying 感應) reinforced 
this ancient belief.  
Two other notable philosophies, Legalism and Daoism, 
influenced the notion of morality in ancient China. 
Legalism rejects the idea of moral education and argues 
for strict punishment for criminal behaviour, while 
Daoism is characterised by passivity and a proclivity 
for withdrawal. Neither posed a challenge to the 
Confucian order, however; rather, after Confucianism 
became the official ideology, there followed ‘a process 
of Confucianization of the legal system’, while Daoism 
complemented rather than questioned the prevalent 
Confucian order (Lei and Tong, 2014: 30).
2.2 Imperial responsibility and 
the ‘Mandate of Heaven’
The sense of responsibility founded upon benevolence 
and morality embedded in ancient Chinese society not 
only governed familial and interpersonal relations, 
but also formed the foundation of the imperial 
government by laying the basis for state responsibility 
and legitimacy. Just as the individual’s obligation 
towards the socially superior was to be obedient and 
submissive, so it was the responsibility of those of 
higher social standing to reciprocate by protecting 
their subordinates. The expansion of responsibility as 
social status increased meant that the emperor, at the 
top of the social order, was the ultimate benefactor 
responsible for safeguarding the wellbeing of his 
citizens by benevolent governance. This was especially 
the case in times of misfortune; known as huangzheng  
(荒政 famine + politics), early literature on the policies, 
practices and institutions of disaster and famine relief 
can be dated back to as early as the Southern Song 
Dynasty (1127–1279) (Chen, 2012: 131). 
This concept of imperial responsibility was reinforced 
by the ancient Chinese idea of a cosmic link between 
natural disasters and human conduct which long 
predated Confucianism. Historical records show that, 
for millennia, China has been struck by natural and 
meteorological disasters: earthquakes and landslides, 
droughts and floods and periodic famines. The 
Chinese term for natural disasters, tianzai (天災), 
literally means ‘heavenly disaster’, and conveys the 
traditional interpretation of natural calamities as 
a form of divine retribution: Heaven’s response to 
human conduct, where ‘[r]ainfall and sunshine were 
thought to be seasonal or unseasonal, appropriate or 
excessive, according to whether human behavior was 
moral or immoral’ (Elvin, 1998: 213). The behaviour of 
different individuals carried different weights. While the 
behaviour of common people ranked last, the actions 
of bureaucrats had a greater effect, and the emperor’s 
conduct was of preeminent importance (Elvin, 1998: 
213). As such, ‘the true ruler must model himself on 
Heaven or the cosmic Way’ (Lewis, 1990: 138).
This ancient belief in astral retribution became 
entangled with the Buddhist idea of karma. These 
influences combined to form the popular expectation 
that the emperor would prevent misfortunes through 
moral conduct; if misfortunes did occur, he would take 
swift and appropriate measures to restore normality. 
The emperor’s ability to do this effectively and through 
benevolent governance was commensurate with the 
legitimacy of his rule, understood as the ‘Mandate 
of Heaven’ (tianming 天命). Illustrative of the link 
between an emperor’s disaster management capabilities 
and his political legitimacy is the story of China’s 
legendary first ruler, Yu the Great (c. 2200–2100 
BC), who became emperor by successfully regulating 
flooding through sophisticated hydraulic systems 
for flood control (Hirono, 2013: S207). Yu also 
introduced water conservation projects and maintained 
granaries (Shapiro, 2001: 7). Conversely, a ruler’s 
failure to honour the Heaven-sanctioned responsibility 
to protect his subjects in times of disaster could end 
in the loss of this legitimacy. The concept of the 
‘Mandate of Heaven’ was employed to justify not only 
the right to rule, but also the ‘right to rebel’ (Lei and 
Tong, 2014: 29). Throughout Chinese history, peasant 
rebellions have brought down dynasties when the 
emperor was perceived to be immoral or incapable of 
protecting his people. 
2.3 Civil charities
Ancient Chinese texts meticulously record the state’s 
responsibility as the preeminent humanitarian 
benefactor. In so doing, however, they tend to 
represent the practice of aid-giving as originating 
solely with the emperor, reducing ‘the people’ to mere 
beneficiaries of imperial charity (Tsu, 1912: 23). In 
reality, charitable philanthropy seems to have been 
so widespread that it outstripped imperial initiatives 
(Tsu, 1912: 23, 28–30). While the public expected 
the state to act as the principal responder in disasters, 
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the limits of state action were generally recognised, as 
was the importance of mobilising local elites outside 
of the government in disaster prevention and response 
(Antony and Leonard, 2002: 1).  
Charitable activities were largely exercised as a 
privilege of China’s Confucian-trained elite. Claiming 
philanthropy as an expression of elite culture, scholars, 
officials and merchants aspiring to social status used 
involvement in charitable enterprises and societies to 
garner social capital and acquire merit, both religious 
– according to Buddhist tenets – and official – in 
line with Confucian strictures (Brokaw, 1991). Thus, 
while China had boasted mutual aid societies from 
the Han Dynasty onwards (206 BC–220), performing 
charitable activities such as the burial of the dead, 
the care of widows and orphans, the provision of 
medical care for the poor, refugee care and spreading 
the teaching of Confucius, Buddha and the emperor 
(Reeves, 2014: 214), by the period of the Ming 
Dynasty (1368–1644) Chinese elites had appropriated 
these long-standing voluntary associations and 
placed them in an elite milieu (Smith, 2009: 50). 
Faith structures such as Confucian ancestral halls 
and Buddhist monasteries also played a key role in 
non-state philanthropic action. Often called ‘lovers 
of charity’ (leshan 樂善), Buddhist philanthropists 
drew upon their religious belief to mobilise donors to 
organise relief programmes. 
Elite charity was privately run, as were faith 
organisations, trade associations and the native 
place societies formed by immigrants for fellow-
provincials in urban areas, notably Shanghai. The 
state, aware of its financial and operational limits, 
encouraged and reinforced these associations. Indeed, 
in exercising what Max Weber called informal 
‘liturgical governance’, whereby ‘local elites were 
called upon to perform important public services on 
the state’s behalf, at their own expense’ (Mann, 1987: 
12–13), these associations acted as a quasi-extension 
of the state, often maintaining close contact with 
the government through sub-county officials who 
were the ‘catalysts for state-society interaction and 
cooperation’ in crisis management (Antony, 2002: 
27–28, 52). As such, China’s culture of philanthropy 
reflects a fundamental difference in Chinese and 
Western concepts of the division between government 
and civil society. Whereas in the West, the state 
creates distinct boundaries between the public and 
private spheres, in China this boundary was vague 
and relative. 
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3 Humanitarian thought and  
 action in the Republic of China 
3.1 Conceptual change at the turn 
of the century
The ubiquitous presence of Confucian doctrine 
in China’s political and social culture came to be 
challenged by new reformist ideas towards the end 
of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). Imperial China 
had suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of the 
British in the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth 
century, resulting in unequal treaties and territorial 
concessions to foreign powers, and against Japan, in 
the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Weakened by 
maladministration and external threats, the imperial 
government had also proved unable to respond 
adequately to a devastating famine in the north of the 
country in 1877–78 which left 13 million people dead 
(Yeophantong, 2014: 8). There was a growing belief 
that Western technology and modernisation were the 
answer to China’s perceived weaknesses. Whereas 
the previous era had been characterised by efforts to 
protect the Confucian heritage, the new intellectual 
tide advocated the wholesale adoption of Western 
practices at the expense of China’s traditional values 
(Sheridan, 1977), and the position of Confucianism as 
a central philosophical system with the answers to all 
of China’s problems began to be called into question 
(Spence, 1990: 275). 
These ideas found their fullest expression following 
the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. 
This marked the beginning of a period of extensive 
intellectual self-scrutiny and exploration commonly 
known as the May Fourth Era. Starting as a student 
movement against the new government’s weak response 
to the Treaty of Versailles, which ceded Shandong 
province to the Japanese, and the perceived continued 
foreign humiliation of China, the May Fourth 
Movement gave rise to a new, iconoclastic Chinese 
intelligentsia. For these intellectuals, ‘traditional’ 
Chinese culture, lacking the attributes of its modern 
European counterpart, was doomed to backwardness 
and weakness. As one wrote, it was only with the 
help of ‘Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science [that we can] 
rescue China from the obscurity that casts upon the 
country’s politics, morality, scholarship, and thought’ 
(Chen, 1919: 10–11). 
These intellectual currents also influenced the way  
humanitarianism was conceptualised. The word  
rendao – humanism or humanitarian – began to be  
used outside of the Confucian context, and with  
the suffix zhuyi (主義), roughly meaning ‘ideology’  
or ‘idea’. With the use of the term rendao zhuyi  
(人道主義), it ceased to be a mere moral concept  
(‘humane’, ‘humanitarian’), and came to be regarded  
as an ideology (‘humanitarianism’). In public debates,  
this new term appeared alongside other ‘Western’  
‘-isms’, such as Marxist-Leninism and Bolshevism. In 
this school of thought, the term ‘humanitarianism’ 
was categorised as advanced and Western, and often 
associated with the idea of democracy. The author 
Tan Mingqian, for example, viewed humanitarianism, 
alongside freedom, fraternity and equality, as the 
fundamental elements of a ‘spiritual democracy’ (Gu, 
2001: 605, 609). According to Li Dazhao, one of a 
group of intellectuals clustered around the periodical 
New Youth, the Allied defeat of Germany had been 
won, not by military strength, but by ‘the victory of 
humanitarianism … the victory of freedom, the victory 
of democracy’ (Li, 1918: 443). 
For the May Fourth intellectuals, humanitarianism 
was regarded both as the most significant attribute of 
modern European culture, and as a ‘universal ideal 
of mankind’ (Wang, 1995: 11). However, while this 
intellectual current was arguably the most vocal, other 
voices spoke in support of traditional Chinese values. 
One Buddhist-inspired philosophical trend saw the 
West as a dehumanised civilization, the antithesis of 
the ‘warm humanity of the Chinese way’, and argued 
for the import of Western ideas only where they did 
not compromise ‘humane’ Chinese values (Sheridan, 
1977: 128–29). There was also a significant left-
wing trend which considered socialist Russia as the 
true humanitarian. Li Dazhao, with Chen Duxiu the 
co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, praised 
the victory of humanitarianism and democracy, but 
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equally applauded ‘the victory of socialism, the victory 
of Bolshevism, the victory of the proletariat’ (Li, 
1918: 443). Indeed, after the October Revolution, and 
especially after the Soviet government had declared the 
abolition of all unequal Sino-Russian treaties, the Soviet 
Union came to be regarded as the ‘embodiment of 
humanitarianism’, attracting significant attention from 
radical scholars (Sheridan, 1977: 111; Gu, 2001: 615).
Important though they were in the late imperial 
and Republican period, Western influences on 
Chinese humanitarianism in fact predated the May 
Fourth Movement. Western missionaries had a 
long-established presence: missionary schools had 
been offering free food, housing and medical care 
since the late sixteenth century, and by the mid-
1800s both missionary and unaffiliated doctors 
were building hospitals with money given by 
Western philanthropists or raised by subscription 
from local Chinese (Spence, 1990: 204–207). 
The most prominent Christian organisation, the 
YMCA, appeared in the 1870s (Garrett, 1970). 
These interactions led to the establishment of relief 
organisations modelled along Western lines. As such, 
the period between the last decades of the Qing 
empire and China’s war against Japan (1937–1945) 
was characterised by the transfer of more and more 
responsibility for relief to private auspices, both 
Chinese and, increasingly, Western.
The late imperial government, too poor and too 
fragmented to provide relief, relied on foreign as well as 
private philanthropic engagement, notably during the 
Great North China Famine of 1877–78. Missionaries 
provided aid to famine victims; Western committees 
in Shanghai and Tianjin also distributed assistance 
(Nathan, 1965: 3), and a China Famine Relief Fund 
was established in the UK. The Fund published a 
booklet of illustrations of famine conditions, greatly 
contributing to awareness of China’s plight abroad (Li, 
2007: 276). Non-governmental famine relief efforts 
during this period were unprecedented in scope and 
form. The gentry and merchants established relief 
offices in Shanghai and other cities (Edgerton-Tarpley, 
2008: 132) independently of official relief institutions. 
Although as in previous periods they cooperated with 
the government, charitable and philanthropic activities 
were no longer exercised as a privilege of the intellectual 
elite, but extended now to China’s lower classes. 
The North China famine relief effort also marked 
the beginning of the internationalisation of China’s 
charitable institutions. One significant step in this 
direction was the foundation of the International  
Red Cross of Shanghai in 1904 (Reeves, 2014: 216). 
The precursor of the Chinese National Red Cross 
Society, it was established by a group of Chinese 
business and political leaders to provide assistance 
to Chinese civilians in Manchuria caught up in 
fighting during the Russo-Japanese war. Officially 
recognised by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in 1912, the Chinese Red Cross 
contributed to relief activities abroad by donating 
significant funds to international Red Cross disaster 
relief, including in response to the earthquakes in 
San Francisco in 1906, Kagoshima in 1914 and 
Tokyo and Yokohama in 1923. By the mid-1930s 
the Society had almost 120,000 members and 500 
chapters (Reeves, 2014: 219). 
When another devastating famine struck Northern 
China in 1920–21, the Chinese International 
Famine Relief Commission (CIFRC), jointly run by 
Chinese and Westerners, played an active role in 
coordinating and managing funds from within China 
and overseas.2  The famine prompted an outpouring 
of generosity in the United States following appeals 
by the CIFRC; the American Red Cross also raised 
significant funds, and there was a ‘contagion of 
philanthropy’ in Beijing and Tianjing, among Chinese 
and Western communities alike (Li, 2007: 297). Aid 
efforts by international committees dominate the 
relief narrative of this period, and the Republican 
government’s response during the famine is generally 
presented as inadequate (Spence, 1990: 309) and 
negligent (Nathan, 1976: 68), with disorder and 
corruption frequently obstructing foreign relief 
efforts (Sheridan, 1966: 23–24). However, while the 
success of international institutions should not be 
underestimated, Fuller (2013) shows that communal 
and government relief efforts were more effective 
and attentive to people’s welfare needs than has 
been previously recognised in the scholarship (Fuller, 
2013). Three segments of Chinese society – Buddhist 
and other Chinese charitable societies, the Republic’s 
military establishment and officials and residents 
of affected communities – came together to provide 
relief, saving lives before the international effort was 
fully mobilised (Fuller, 2013: 3–5). 
 
2 Institutions were interlocked to a remarkable extent: 
the CIFRC’s founders and directors, for instance, were 
missionaries, churchmen and foreign and Chinese YMCA 
officials (Thomson, 1969: 46).
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The Republican government also undertook efforts to 
modernise its disaster relief capabilities, beginning the 
first systematic monitoring of the Yellow River’s flow 
in 1922 and developing plans to tackle flooding along 
China’s major rivers (Chen, 2012: 133). However, the 
civil war with the communists, which began in 1927, 
and, later, the conflict with Japan seriously hampered 
this work, and the war effort took priority over 
relief. In one instance, the government’s war priorities 
actually created a humanitarian disaster when a dyke 
on the Yellow River was opened in an effort to halt 
the Japanese advance, causing a disastrous flood 
in 1938. Dubbed the ‘largest act of environmental 
warfare in history’ (Dutch, 2009), the destruction of 
the dyke diverted the course of the river southwards, 
claiming at least half a million lives in central China 
(Chen, 2012: 133).
As the conflict with Japan developed into a fully-
fledged war in the summer of 1937, newspapers 
collected donations to support the war effort and for 
relief work, and civilian cooperative humanitarian 
efforts, in particular women’s associations, increased 
(Stranahan, 1998: 220–21). Displaced people fleeing 
to cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin 
were sheltered in temples, schools and native place 
associations, and fundraising events were held to 
collect money for food and medicine (Stranahan, 
2000: 166). As the war progressed, however, Western 
charities began to dominate, and missionaries 
contributed heavily towards local relief. During the 
mass atrocities against civilians known as the Nanking 
Massacre in 1937, several missionaries reported 
Chinese suffering at the hands of the Japanese and 
took the lead in establishing a safety zone to protect 
civilians (Varg, 1977: 252–53, 258). A charitable 
organisation known as the Nanking International 
Relief Committee sponsored surveys to provide 
information on the violence. Its chairman, John Rabe, 
a German businessman, provided shelter for hundreds 
of refugees, and on his return to Germany Rabe 
sought to publicise the situation in China through 
public lectures (Yoshida, 2006: 30–32). Indigenous 
organisations such as the Daoist-Buddhist Red 
Swastika Society (hongwanzihui 紅卐字會) were also 
active (Dubois, 2008; 2011). 
Despite Chinese–Western philanthropic cooperation 
during the war against Japan, mutual distrust 
was ever-present. This was nowhere more evident 
than in the relationship between the Chinese 
government and the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). UNRRA 
was established in 1943 with the objective of 
providing aid, rehabilitation and resettlement 
assistance. Of its 24 country offices, the one in 
China was the largest, providing over $500m-
worth of supplies and employing a staff of 1,300 
(Greene, 1951). Uniquely, UNRRA technical staff 
were also seconded to line ministries such as health, 
agriculture and communications, helping to expedite 
UNRRA programmes and providing technical and 
administrative support. UNRRA was also involved 
in the massive operation to restore the dyke on the 
Yellow River destroyed by the Chinese in 1938 (the 
river finally returned to its pre-1938 course in 1947).
Although operations within the country were formally 
the responsibility of the Chinese government, relations 
were poor and China was frequently criticised for 
appropriating UNRRA goods and funds: ‘Not 
much aid – as aid – went beyond the warehouses 
at Shanghai’ (Kerr, 1966: 159), and ‘the ineptitude, 
paralysis, and outright corruption of the [Chinese] 
officialdom remained the dominant themes’ in foreign 
press coverage (Isaacs, 1962: 188). There was general 
scepticism about China’s capacity to respond to 
humanitarian issues; as one US official noted, ‘if peace 
comes suddenly, it is reasonable to expect widespread 
confusion and disorder [since] [t]he Chinese have 
no plans for rehabilitation, prevention of epidemics, 
restoration of utilities, establishment of balanced 
economy and re-disposition of millions of refugees’ 
(cited in Spence, 1990: 484). Another reported that 
‘governmental organization and responsibility for 
the handling of relief in the best of times were not 
to be compared to those of Europe’ (Greene, 1951). 
These problems were compounded by severe logistical 
difficulties and insecurity. China’s main ports were so 
congested that at one stage UNRRA shipments stopped, 
and inland transport was extremely poor (ibid.). Several 
UNRRA officials were killed in ambushes in communist 
areas, and the government refused to deliver goods to 
areas under communist control (Mitter, 2013: 66–67). 
There was also criticism of UNRRA’s competence 
and effectiveness – even its own staff admitted that its 
contribution was tiny compared to the scale of need 
– and its operating costs were high, amounting to up 
to 40% of the value of commodities delivered (Greene, 
1951; Neils, 1990: 172).
The period from the turn of the century until the 
end of the Japanese war saw increased Western 
humanitarian involvement in China, heavy constraints 
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on government relief due to economic and political 
problems and the continuation of local charitable 
action as a supplement to governmental relief. 
Despite the arrival of many new Western ideas, 
the Confucian idea of a well-ordered state still 
held currency, although the conflict curtailed the 
government’s efforts to act as principal benefactor in 
times of disaster. Drought, military procurements and 
a famine in Henan province in 1943–44 combined 
to leave between two and three million people dead 
and another three million displaced, fuelling popular 
discontent with the government (Westad, 2012: 270), 
even to the extent of starving peasants assisting the 
Japanese against government forces (Sheridan, 1977: 
262). While many foreign relief efforts were welcomed 
by the Chinese, collaboration was frequently impeded, 
and cooperation with UNRRA was obstructed by the 
intensifying conflict with the CCP.
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4.1 Marxist humanitarianism
The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 saw many ideas redefined to suit the ideological 
stance of the new communist regime, including the 
idea of ‘humanitarianism’. Mao’s interpretation of 
Marxist humanitarianism as the antithesis of ‘capitalist 
humanitarianism’ is still visible today: the entry 
for ‘humanitarianism’ in the widely used Chinese 
dictionary the Hanyu Da Cidian states that the concept 
has ‘always been a system of thought belonging 
to the capitalist class’. It then describes ‘Marxist 
humanitarianism’ (Makesi rendao zhuyi
(马克思人道主义) as a form of humanitarianism 
based on the Marxist doctrine of class struggle 
aimed at ‘safeguarding the dignity and rights of the 
working class’. As such, Marxist humanitarianism was 
‘essentially different from bourgeois humanitarianism’.3
This conceptual difference featured heavily in the 
Literary Gazette (Wenyi bao文艺报), a magazine known 
for publishing radical articles. One article from 1960 
states that ‘humanitarianism has more and more become 
a tool used by the bourgeoisie to cover up capitalism’s 
merciless exploitation and oppression, to cover up class 
contradictions, and to deceive the proletariat … [u]
nder the name of the abstract humanitarianism, [the 
revisionists] vend the opium of bourgeois humani-
tarianism’ (Wenyibao, 1960: 101). The Gazette’s 
analogy between bourgeois humanitarianism and opium, 
still fresh in the country’s memory as a powerful symbol 
of the toxic Western influence that paralysed Chinese 
society in the nineteenth century, is a striking example 
of the antipathy the term evoked. (It also, of course, 
echoes Marx’s famous dictum about religion as the 
opium of the people.) 
The word ‘humanitarianism’ was now almost 
exclusively used in anti-Western polemics. This is not 
to say, however, that notions of ‘humanitarianism’ 
in the Mao era were founded upon objections 
to liberal democratic concepts alone; China also 
developed its own, new understanding of assistance. 
This idea manifested itself in the ‘Three World’ 
theory, credited to Mao and first explicitly presented 
by Deng Xiaoping in a speech at the UN in 1974, 
which categorised the world into three camps: 
the First World, comprising the United States and 
the Soviet Union; the Third World, comprising 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
(including China); and the Second World, made up 
of the developed countries in between. The ‘Three 
Worlds theory’ aspired to unite ‘progressive’ Third 
World states, win over the ‘middle’ Second World 
and isolate the two ‘reactionary’ superpowers (Yee, 
1983: 241). Promoting development assistance to 
the Third World and the provision of assistance to 
revolutionary movements abroad, this became the 
cornerstone of China’s aid-giving in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. Development assistance was not regarded 
as ‘humanitarian assistance’ (rendao zhuyi yuanzhu), 
which was rejected as an ‘imperialist plot’ devised 
by the bourgeoisie, but as a ‘Chinese’ alternative to 
it, in line with principles agreed at the Asian-African 
Conference in Bandung in 1955.4  
While new orthodoxies were being formulated, 
traditional concepts underwent dramatic change. 
One was the concept of natural disasters as a signal 
of heavenly displeasure with man’s behaviour. 
Under communism, this age-old cosmic link was 
snapped: in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation 
and collectivisation by means of a mass mobilisation 
campaign known as the Great Leap Forward, Mao 
regarded nature as ‘an enemy to be overcome, an 
adversary to be brought to heel’, and proceeded 
under the slogan Ren Ding Sheng Tian (人定胜天), 
‘Man Must Conquer Nature’ (Dikötter, 2010: 174). 
Polarising and adversarial language – nature was to 
be ‘conquered’, ‘victories’ to be won against flood 
4 Change and continuity under  
 Mao
3  In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Karl Marx described 
philanthropists and humanitarians, among others, ‘as incurable 
agents of the exploiting classes’ (Roberts, 2004: 5) ‘desirous of 
redressing social grievances in order to secure the continued 
existence of bourgeois society’ (Marx, 2011: 97).
4 These principles included mutual respect for sovereignty, non-
aggression, non-interference, equality and cooperation.
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Figure 2: ‘Earthquakes cannot frighten us, the people will certainly conquer nature’
Propaganda poster referring to the Tangshan Earthquake, 1976. © Collection International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam).
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and drought – filled official discourse (Shapiro, 2001: 
3). Convinced that the passion for revolution could 
transform nature to fit human needs, natural disasters 
– hitherto feared as divine punishment for human 
misconduct – were no longer considered a serious 
threat. This conviction found institutional expression 
with the abolition of the Central Committee on 
Disaster Relief in 1958, which had been established 
eight years earlier to coordinate the government’s 
disaster management work (Chen, 2012: 134).
Ancient Confucian values were also purged (Leng, 
1977: 365, 369–70). Whereas imperial China had 
propagated a world order of hierarchies among 
unequals integrated into a system of reciprocal 
relations, the ideological imperative now was the 
creation of an egalitarian community. This was also 
shaped by the Marxist idea that ‘social harmony is 
obtained not through legislative reforms … but by 
destroying those antagonisms that originate in the 
division of labour’; once these antagonisms had been 
destroyed, ‘solidarity, and not legal and constraining 
regulation of institutions, [would allow] one to  
assure the harmony of human relationships’ 
(Coicaud, 2002: 28). In contrast to the Confucian 
ideal of stability and harmony, Maoism sought 
explicitly to overthrow the status quo (Chan, 1999: 
203) and create a ‘Chinese world order that saw 
virtue in contention and upheaval, not in order and 
stability’ (Foot, 2013: 25). 
Despite this urge to overthrow Confucian values 
as feudal and reactionary, those elements of 
Marxism that gained real traction within China 
did so precisely because they resonated with their 
Confucian predecessors, and there were strong echoes 
of Confucian ideas in much of the Maoist practice 
of governance, such as ‘self-criticism’ or the belief 
that rulers should be morally upright (Bell, 2008: 
10). Certain structures of thought also persisted: 
Billiourd (2007: 56) notes the extent to which Chinese 
communism was infused with the Confucian  
tradition of self-cultivation (xiuyang 修养) and ‘inner 
sainthood’ (neisheng 内圣). The Confucian principle 
of minben (民本) – people as the start and end 
points of governance – did not change, and political 
deliberations under Mao were based on much of 
what had made Confucianism popular, where the old 
concepts of legitimacy and responsibility remained 
crucial components. Mao was supremely concerned 
with the question of legitimacy. Since ‘having the 
commanding height on moral issues legitimizes 
the state power’, criticism of the government was 
tantamount to charging it with immorality (Tong, 
2011: 152–53). This serves to explain communist 
China’s sensitivity towards criticism and the 
persecution of real and perceived dissidents under the 
Maoist regime. 
Domestic purges and the removal of foreign elements 
from China in an effort to ‘cleanse’ it of ‘capitalist’ 
influences had far-reaching consequences in times of 
crisis. Religious institutions such as temples, shrines 
and monasteries were closed (Becker, 1996: 51), 
missionaries expelled or incarcerated and their  
medical and educational institutions taken over by 
the state (Westad, 2012: 326; Varg, 1977: 305–6). 
Meanwhile, peasants were organised into ‘mutual aid 
teams’ (huzhuzu 互助组), before being collectivised 
into agricultural cooperatives during the Great 
Leap Forward. All of these moves meant that, when 
the Great Leap Forward produced a widespread 
famine between 1958 and 1961, traditional coping 
mechanisms, such as private charity, state assistance 
and mutual help, failed. The Chinese Red Cross 
Society was branded feudal, revisionist and capitalist, 
and, although internationally it entered one of its 
most active periods, it all but shut down domestically 
(Reeves, 2014: 226). Coupled with this ban on non-
state relief, the government refused foreign assistance, 
even from the socialist bloc; aid from East Germany, 
for example, was rejected, and Chinese embassies 
were instructed not to accept donations.5 During 
the devastating Tangshan earthquake in July 1976, 
the government rejected international assistance 
altogether, including from bodies such as the UN  
and the ICRC, and prevented foreign journalists  
from entering the disaster area, instead recommend-
ing that the victims lead thrifty lives and resume 
production as soon as possible (Chen, 2012: 
134–35). Medical teams and People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) troops were sent to the disaster area 
as part of a national relief campaign (Spence, 1990: 
649), but inadequate training impeded government 
efforts to such a degree that some 80% of survivors 
were thought to have been rescued by local people 
(Suttmeier, 2012: 126 n8). 
5 The lack of relief efforts by the government stemmed not so 
much from an inability to provide them as from the fact that the 
famine was not allowed to be defined as a crisis. The Great 
Leap Famine has never been officially described as a famine 
or disaster within China, and the common term for it today is 
the rather euphemistic ‘Three Difficult Years’ (sannian kunnan 
shiqi 三年困难时期). While widely studied in the West, Chinese-
language sources on the event remain scarce, and it is still a 
politically sensitive topic in China.
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The government’s reaction to the Great Leap 
Forward famine and the Tangshan earthquake 
illustrates how the source of state legitimacy had 
changed. Just as it did for imperial dynasties, so for 
the communists legitimacy was a key and overriding 
concern. Radical rhetorical departures from China’s 
cultural traditions notwithstanding, Mao was never 
able to extricate himself from the ultimate goal the 
ancient emperors had sought for centuries, namely 
securing state legitimacy by winning the approval of 
the Chinese people. Now, however, that legitimacy 
was seen to flow, not so much from the state’s 
traditional function of protecting its people during 
disasters, but rather from improved social welfare 
and the establishment of China as the leader of the 
Third World and the vanguard of ‘true’ Marxism, 
in opposition to the Soviet model. Mao’s domestic 
legitimacy was largely founded on his ‘humanitarian’ 
responsibility, but this did not mean the state’s 
capacity to save lives following disasters; instead, it 
consisted of the creation of an egalitarian society. 
This was to be achieved by increasing life expectancy 
and bettering the lives of Chinese peasants through 
government welfare and by means of mass campaigns 
such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution (as well as creating a cult of personality 
around Mao himself). International legitimacy 
derived from China’s support ‘to help the proletariat 
of the world revolt and overthrow the decadent, 
imperialist regimes and the “old world order”’ 
(Chan, 2013: 61).
According to the ‘Three World theory’, China was 
to become both the guardian of the Third World, 
founded on its support for national liberation 
movements, and the true leader of the Communist 
bloc, based on its revolutionary zeal. Economic aid 
to developing countries was regarded as a political 
demonstration of China’s power as leader of the Third 
World (Bartke, 1989: 7), and China’s ambition to 
be such a power dictated a focus on economic and 
financial assistance rather than humanitarian aid. In 
its early days, the PRC provided military and food 
aid assistance to North Korea during the Korean 
War (Cathcart and Kraus, 2011: 37, 44–5) and to 
Vietnam in the Indochinese War, and offered loans to 
Cambodia and Nepal (Bartke, 1989: 10). The sudden 
recall of Soviet workers from China in 1960, amid 
rapidly deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, brought 
in its wake a rapid turn towards non-communist 
Asia, the Middle East and especially Africa (Cooper, 
1976: 117), and Chinese economic assistance became 
‘increasingly tied to requirements of anti-Soviet 
behavior on the part of recipients’ (Hamlin, 1986: 
42). In 1963 Algeria became the first recipient of 
Chinese medical aid during its independence war with 
the French (Li, 2012: 126); by 1970 ten countries 
were receiving Chinese medical aid, and by 1980 
that number had risen to 32 (Bartke, 1989: 20). 
Infrastructure aid to Africa also increased, including 
the construction of a 1,900km rail line between 
Tanzania and Zambia, though economic aid declined 
in the 1970s under Premier Zhou Enlai (Bartke, 
1989: 10, 13). The Chinese Red Cross Society saw its 
most active phase internationally during this period, 
sponsoring efforts to repatriate Japanese citizens 
stranded in China in the early 1950s and offering 
disaster relief support to some 140 countries in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, totalling over 
1 billion Renminbi (Reeves, 2014: 226).
Throughout the Mao years from 1949 to 1976, 
the political culture of the People’s Republic built 
upon many of the values inherited from imperial 
China, while also modifying ancient concepts to fit 
its ideological agenda. ‘[T]he Communist system, 
like the traditional Chinese political system, sought 
legitimacy in an official ideology, in this case 
Marxism-Leninism’, which claimed to offer guidelines 
for China’s economic and social development as well 
as a set of moral standards for the conduct of officials 
and ordinary citizens (Harding, 1987: 25–26). While 
in official discourse the term ‘humanitarianism’ was 
redefined to suit Marxist doctrine, the CCP leadership 
formulated its own concepts of responsibility 
related to ‘humanitarianism’ both in a domestic and 
international sense, which in turn translated into state 
legitimacy. While the source of state responsibility 
changed, the traditional idea of responsibility as 
legitimising the power of the ruler persisted. 
   15
5.1 New concepts and debates
Humanitarianism (rendao zhuyi) re-emerged in 
intellectual discourse in the early 1980s after leading 
Party members such as Wang Ruoshui and Zhou 
Yang encouraged the Party leadership to redefine 
Marxism-Leninism in a kinder and gentler form 
(Davies, 2007: 120–21). According to Wang, the 
‘starting point of Marxism is man’ (Wang, 1986: 
202–3); humanitarianism did not exclusively belong 
to the bourgeoisie, as Marx was also a great humanist 
(Hua, 1995: 99). Wang argued for ‘a socialist 
humanitarianism … [which means] upholding the 
principle that all men are equal before the truth and 
the law and that a citizen’s personal freedom and 
dignity are inviolable’ (cited in Goldman, 1994: 117). 
Socialist humanitarianism was also supported by 
the controversial writer Dai Houying, whose hero 
in her 1980 novel People, ah, People! (Ren, a, ren!) 
presented a very un-Marxist idea by arguing that 
social problems should be solved, not by class struggle 
but by humanitarianism, which he set in opposition to 
politics (Yang, 1985: 513–14). 
Wang’s colleague Ru Xin also argued that Marxism 
included humanitarianism, and as such should not 
be set in fundamental opposition to humanitarianism 
because, although the latter had originated from an 
‘ideological and cultural movement launched by the 
rising bourgeoisie during the European Renaissance’, 
it also referred to ‘attaching importance to the value 
of man … Man himself is the highest aim of mankind 
and man’s value is in himself’ (cited in Goldman, 
1994: 74). Conservatives such as Hu Qiaomu, on 
the other hand, rejected Wang’s and other scholars’ 
claim that ‘man is the starting point of Marxism’, 
arguing that Marx had not used concepts as abstract 
as ‘man’ and ‘human nature’. The scholar Li Zehou 
also disagreed with Wang, in that he believed that 
Chinese and Western humanitarianism were not the 
same, as the former could be traced back to Confucius 
and Mencius, ‘stressing amicable cooperation and 
mutual aid’, whereas the latter had originated from 
‘the individual; the wish during the Renaissance to be 
liberated from the yokes of the church in the Middle 
Ages’ (Li, 1986: 208).
This re-evaluation of humanitarianism was part of a 
wider questioning of Marxism-Leninism in the wake of 
the Cultural Revolution. A ten-year social experiment 
conducted by Mao between 1966 and 1976, the 
Cultural Revolution had caused massive civil unrest; 
tens of thousands of people were killed and millions of 
‘intellectuals’ and ‘bourgeois’ were forced into manual 
labour. The upheaval destroyed a large amount of the 
political credibility the Party had accumulated, and 
plunged it into a legitimacy crisis (Harding, 1987). 
Many scholars, drawing on their own disillusionment 
during the Cultural Revolution, came to challenge 
what they saw as an ossified interpretation of Marxism 
in the atmosphere of gradual liberalisation that took 
hold during the 1980s. In parallel, in a ‘renaissance 
of Confucianism’ (Holbig and Gilley, 2010: 21), 
influential scholars reassessed traditional Confucian 
values (Goldman, 1994: 77). Regarded as a repressive 
ideology throughout the Mao period, many discourses 
now stressed the ancient Confucian emphasis on 
harmony and responsibility. Some referred to the values 
Confucianism shared with Western humanitarianism; 
one news article emphasised that, although European 
humanitarianism originated during the Renaissance, 
‘the same world view was already expressed in the 
humanitarian doctrines of Confucius almost 2000 years 
before the Renaissance, and it became later the fine 
tradition of Confucianism’ (Goldman, 1994: 77). With 
these new interpretations, the Chinese understanding 
of humanitarianism was finally beginning to lose 
some of the historical burden of its Western capitalist 
connotations (Hirono, 2013: S208). 
This return to the previously suppressed Confucian 
orthodoxy had initially emanated from society rather 
than the government; by the mid-1980s, however, the 
Party was also turning towards these old teachings 
in a bid to reinforce the legitimacy of its rule. The 
violent crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square 
5  Liberalisation and the  
 post-Cold War era
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in 1989 added special urgency to the restoration of 
state legitimacy, and the complexity and flexibility 
of Confucianism made it easy to incorporate into 
both Maoism and more liberal interpretations 
(Moody, in Deng and Guo, 2011). Those elements of 
Confucianism most suited to supporting the status 
quo – social order, stability, harmony, acceptance of 
hierarchy and the knowing of place – were translated 
into a ‘tailor-made socialist Confucianism’ (Holbig and 
Gilley, 2010: 22). References to Confucian-sounding 
ideas increased in official discourse, notably during 
the presidency of Hu Jintao between 2003 and 2013. 
When he took power, Hu introduced the concept of 
‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui) as a vision for 
the country’s future socioeconomic development. 
Hu’s belief that China should promote values such 
as honesty and unity, as well as forging a closer 
relationship between the people and the government, 
strongly echoed Confucian themes (Bell, 2008: 9). 
Society would be ‘harmonised’ by means of a second 
concept, ‘scientific development’ (kexue fazhan), which 
‘takes a human-oriented approach [yiren weiben] 
... and promotes comprehensive economic, social, 
and human development’ (quoted in Hirono, 2013: 
S208). The human-oriented approach was designed 
to help China ‘achieve comprehensive development 
and advance its notion of socialist humanitarianism’ 
by bringing development to the most impoverished 
regions in the country, with the ultimate aim of 
unifying the state and its people (Hirono, 2013: S208).
The ancient Confucian link between popular support 
and the state’s disaster management capabilities also 
regained its old centrality. The idea of responsibility 
based on the provision of popular welfare evident 
during the Mao era still featured prominently. In a 
remarkable effort, China lifted over half a billion 
people out of poverty between 1981 and 2004 
(World Bank, 2009: 6). This may explain why the 
term ‘parental officials’ (fu-mu guan 父母官), an 
expression tracing back to the Han dynasty (206 
BC–220 AD), resurfaced following the end of Mao’s 
regime, reflecting the renewed validity of this ancient 
paternalistic state–society relationship in modern 
China (Tong, 2011: 151, n16).6 At the same time, 
however, the Chinese government recognised the 
necessity to ‘integrate disaster reduction into the 
comprehensive plan for national economy and social 
development’ (quoted in UNEP, 2002: 271). Reflecting 
this, the China National Commission for the 
International Decade on Natural Disaster Reduction 
(CNC-IDNDR) was established in 1989 and, following 
a series of devastating floods, most notably in Anhui 
and Jiangsu in 1991 and the Yangtse river basin flood 
in 1998, a national natural disaster reduction plan 
was promulgated to guide the Commission’s work. 
In 2004, the Commission was renamed the National 
Commission for Disaster Reduction (Guojia jianzai 
weiyuanhui), an inter-ministerial conference and 
coordination body within the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(minzhengbu). Now comprising 30 ministries and 
departments, it is responsible for disaster research, 
policy and planning and the management of funds in 
major domestic disasters. 
It was also during Hu’s presidency that China 
visibly departed from its isolationist stance and 
became increasingly involved on the international 
stage. As ideology-based legitimacy lost ground, so 
recognition abroad came to be seen as a measure of 
the government’s political success domestically. Thus, 
while China’s domestic politics and political culture 
decisively shape its international behaviour, domestic 
legitimacy is in turn nurtured and enhanced by the 
country’s image as a prestigious and responsible 
great power in the international sphere. This dual 
interplay between legitimacy and responsibility, 
domestic and international, laid the foundation for 
China’s engagement in foreign aid and disaster relief. 
It provided food aid during the famine in North Korea 
in the 1990s (Kim, 2010: 113), and offered significant 
funds following the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, 
the Kashmir earthquake in 2005 and Cyclone Nargis 
in 2008. China’s response during the tsunami was 
unprecedented both in size and in form, as for the first 
time the country channelled humanitarian donations 
through multilateral mechanisms, mainly UN agencies 
(Binder and Conrad, 2009: 9–10). Beijing also used its 
economic and diplomatic leverage over the Sudanese 
government to secure its consent to intervention in 
response to the conflict in Darfur in 2003. Where 
once the ICRC was dismissed as a lackey of Western 
imperialism, in 2013 China welcomed its president on 
a visit to Beijing. 
Conversely, in contrast to its rejection of assistance 
under Mao, Beijing no longer regards foreign aid as 
a source of shame (Chan, 2013: 57). Japan launched 
its Overseas Development Assistance programme in 
China in 1980, the same year the country acceded to 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
6 During the Mao era the term was replaced by ‘people’s 
servants’ (Tong, 2011: 151). 
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and during the 1980s China was one of the world’s 
largest recipients of World Bank loans (Mitchell and 
McGiffert, 2007: 17). Long-standing suspicions of 
foreign aid agencies also eased, to the extent that, in 
the response to the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, 
the government granted both foreign and Chinese 
aid workers almost unlimited access to affected areas 
(Binder and Conrad, 2009: 9–10). 
Convergence with international norms and practices 
has been less evident with regard to humanitarian 
intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
Chinese distrust of foreign intervention is rooted in the 
assaults on its sovereignty the country endured in the 
nineteenth century, and the concept of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of sovereign states is woven into 
its political fabric. Resistance to democracy at home 
and its own human rights practices, China’s multi-
ethnic character and the existence within it of separatist 
movements all make the country particularly sensitive to 
questions of sovereignty. Thus, while China has endorsed 
the basic tenets of R2P and has largely supported UN 
Resolutions under Chapter VII authorising the use of 
force, for historical, cultural and political reasons the 
country is likely to remain cautious about humanitarian 
interventions and the use of force without the consent of 
the country concerned (Teitt, 2008). 
Strong language tends to permeate Chinese discourses 
on humanitarian intervention, as was the case in 
2001 when Chinese representatives stated that ‘the 
conceptualization of humanitarian intervention is 
a total fallacy’ (ICISS, 2001). The Syrian conflict 
serves as an illustrative practical example of the 
difference between Western and Chinese attitudes 
towards humanitarian intervention. China has vetoed 
UN Security Council resolutions which would have 
condemned Syrian action and potentially resulted in 
sanctions, and in May 2014 it opposed the referral 
of the Syrian crisis to the International Criminal 
Court. In addition to its economic relations with the 
Syrian government, China’s aid to ‘rogue states’ such 
as Sudan or Zimbabwe has been denounced in the 
West as sustaining autocratic regimes (Hirono and 
Suzuki, 2014: 447), and as driven by economic motives 
(Nakano and Prantl, 2011: 12). In particular, China 
has been criticised for its substantial involvement 
in Sudan’s oil industry and for selling arms to the 
Sudanese government. Likewise, China earned 
international and domestic condemnation for its 
initially small contribution to the response to Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines, which almost certainly 
reflected a recent deterioration in relations between 
the two countries over territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea. Yet Western governments too have provided 
support for regimes with questionable human rights 
records, as evinced by British and American backing 
for the Mubarak regime in Egypt, and foreign policy 
calculations figure in aid calculations in Washington, 
London and Brussels just as much as they do in 
Beijing. Despite frequent claims that China is somehow 
‘different’ to the West, when it comes to national self-
interest its behaviour is perhaps not so different after 
all (Suzuki and Hirono, 2014: 445).
18   Responsibility, legitimacy, morality: Chinese humanitarianism in historical perspective
   19
The meaning behind being ‘humanitarian’, namely 
‘concerned with or seeking to promote human 
welfare’,7 is deeply entrenched in China’s rich 
philosophical heritage. To be sure, as would be 
expected in a country as large, diverse and complex 
as China, there has always been a kaleidoscope of 
divergent cultural influences which shaped discourses 
and politics at any given time. Thus, while resisting 
the temptation to regard China as a static and 
universal whole, it is clear that no other philosophy 
has influenced China’s state and people as consistently, 
sustainably and fundamentally as Confucianism. 
It would be tremendously difficult to gain an 
appreciation of China’s sense of humanitarianism 
outside of this Confucian prism.
For centuries Confucian notions such as ren 
(benevolence) permeated traditional Chinese 
philanthropy, which was exercised first as a privilege 
of the intellectual elite, and later by broader sections of 
society. More importantly, however, it is the Confucian 
notion of a harmonious world order guaranteed by 
the dual ideal of responsibility and legitimacy that 
has shaped Chinese humanitarian thought and action. 
On an individual level, every member of society had 
a clearly defined responsibility according to his or her 
status, while the emperor, understood as the ultimate 
moral benefactor, was responsible for protecting his 
people in times of crisis. The government’s capacity to 
alleviate suffering effectively translated into its legitimacy 
to rule. As popular dissent against a government 
could and often did result in the end of a dynasty, the 
emperor constantly sought the moral approval of his 
people by fulfilling his responsibilities to the best of his 
ability. Therefore, while the Western understanding of 
humanitarianism is based on the principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence, China’s notion 
of the same has always been shaped by the Confucian 
ideals of responsibility and legitimacy. 
 
This concern with state responsibility and legitimacy 
has largely persisted. When the Republic of China 
was founded in 1912, many new, Western-inspired 
interpretations of humanitarianism emerged. However, 
traditional Confucian ideals and an understanding of 
the state’s responsibility to protect its people still held 
currency. In the Maoist years, ‘humanitarianism’ was 
presented as a Western-introduced narcotic as harmful 
as opium, designed to debilitate Chinese society, and 
the concept of ‘Marxist humanitarianism’ based on 
the doctrine of class struggle was promoted in its 
stead. Even at the height of Maoist rule, however, 
when Chinese culture was supposedly being redefined, 
core Confucian ideals persisted in the concept of the 
moral leader and an emphasis on corruption in public 
life (Tong, 2011: 152). Mao himself was extremely 
concerned with state legitimacy and sought the moral 
approval of China’s people to secure the right to rule 
– the ancient ‘Mandate of Heaven’. The bolstering 
of Mao’s image via a cult of personality, and the 
much-publicised fulfilment of an adjusted version of 
responsibility, namely improvements in living standards 
in an egalitarian community at home and support for 
proletarian revolutions abroad, all served this end.
Scholarly interest in the rediscovery of Confucianism 
since the 1980s has translated into a revival of 
Confucian language in official documents over the 
past decade. After the Cultural Revolution and 
later the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, 
the government began to appropriate elements 
of Confucian thought to shore up its legitimacy 
(Billiourd, 2007: 51). The Confucian values of 
legitimacy and responsibility deeply influenced 
China’s actions in the humanitarian sphere as well, 
where the government’s disaster relief capacity once 
again became a central responsibility and source of 
legitimacy. However, it is also here where change 
becomes visible: whereas earlier state responsibility 
and, with it, legitimacy had rested on domestic 
disaster assistance (Hirono, 2012: 27), the rise 
of China as a global power has expanded this 
concept internationally, and international prestige 
has become an important new source of legitimacy. 
Although China’s growing international role has yet 
to be reflected in the volumes of its humanitarian 
assistance (Harmer and Martin, 2010: 19), the 
country’s foreign aid has grown steadily in line with 
its economic development, while China itself has 
begun to accept cash and material goods from other 
6  Conclusion
7 The Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘humanitarian’.
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countries in the event of domestic disasters. China has 
become increasingly integrated into the international 
community, has begun to channel humanitarian aid 
through multilateral mechanisms and has endorsed 
the basic tenets of the Responsibility to Protect. 
Aspiring to project the image of a responsible great 
power, China has gradually departed from ideology 
and adopted a more pragmatic, realist stance. With 
a more vocal, visible and active involvement in 
international humanitarian efforts, China’s notion of 
humanitarianism is becoming global. 
At the same time, this new source of legitimacy 
continues to be shaped by old values. China’s domestic 
political culture is informed by traditional ideals, 
‘ethics rather than law, moral consensus rather than 
judicial procedure, and benevolent government rather 
than […] checks and balances’, and this heavily 
influences the country’s behaviour within international 
organisations (Kent, 2013: 139–40). In particular, the 
idea of benevolent governance remains highly relevant, 
and forms part of the ancient notion of unity between 
the state and its people. Apart from its increasing 
references to Confucian harmony, the government has 
also adopted a new rhetoric of public accountability 
which uses ‘the vocabulary of democracy in versatile 
ways aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of one-party 
rule’, communicating the message of ‘democratic 
centralism’ or ‘the people’s democracy’ to its citizens, 
while speaking of growing democracy within 
China (Davies, 2010: 81). Over time, therefore, the 
Confucian concepts of responsibility and legitimacy 
have evolved to include contemporary elements in the 
changing political context.
This brief survey of China’s past helps in 
understanding why the country is acting the way it is 
in its international humanitarian practice. In trying 
to understand Chinese thinking, it is important to 
appreciate its unique political culture, including the dual 
concept of responsibility and legitimacy which has for 
millennia shaped China’s actions, humanitarian and 
otherwise. It is equally important to understand that 
these concepts may bear different understandings than in 
the West. Legitimacy in China is fundamentally different 
since it is not based on rational calculations and 
institutional logic, but rather on the normative order 
and moral responsibility of leaders: in China, legitimacy 
does not flow from how a leader obtains power, but 
rather how that power is exercised (Lei and Tong, 2014: 
30), and social welfare has always been a key virtue in 
the execution of government power (Reeves, 2014: 215). 
While within the international community there 
exists a view that China should adopt ‘Western’ 
values, such as democracy, solidarity, human rights 
and the rule of law, China believes that it is these 
values that must adapt to it, and seeks to ‘Sinify’ 
the prevailing international system with some of 
its own distinctive values. It is China’s political 
identity that has painted the unique picture of the 
Chinese humanitarian landscape, and which will 
continue to exert a strong influence on the country’s 
humanitarian action.
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